It all started with a few European units visible on the Greenland ice sheet. As Donald Trump threatens to impose 10% surcharges starting February 1st on eight European countries involved in defending the Arctic territory, Emmanuel Macron has announced that he will request the activation of the European Union’s “anti-coercion instrument” if these threats are carried out. For the first time, the EU is considering using this “legal bazooka” designed to respond to economic blackmail by a major power, and this time, a historic ally is the target.
In Greenland, images released in mid-January provided a first glimpse of an increased military presence by European countries in the area, set against a backdrop of tensions with Washington. A team of 15 German soldiers sent on a reconnaissance mission returned on Monday after “gathering information on the ground about possible German contributions to joint security reinforcement in the Arctic,” according to the German delegation to NATO.
Since then, Trump announced on Saturday that he would impose 10% surcharges on imports from Denmark, Sweden, Norway, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and the United Kingdom starting February 1st, with a possible increase to 25% in June if no agreement is reached on the “complete and total purchase of Greenland.” These tariffs would come on top of the 15% duties on European products already in force since the agreement of summer 2025. In a bilateral scenario, each capital would be tempted to give in to protect its exporters, but we have the European Union!
The Anti-Coercion Instrument: Attacking One Country Now Means Attacking the Whole of Europe
Over the weekend, the French President’s entourage mentioned the anti-coercion instrument in response to the US President. In 2023, the EU adopted a regulation to defend itself against economic coercion by third countries. The Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), provided for in Regulation (EU) 2023/2675, organizes a collective response from the single market when a Member State is targeted in order to force a change in policy: an attack on one country is treated as an attack on all 27. Stéphane Séjourné, Vice-President of the European Commission, described the current situation as a “textbook case of coercion,” stating that “the definition of coercion is very clear in European texts.”
When faced with trade tensions, the European Union has one golden rule: dialogue above all else. The aim is to calm things down through diplomacy before resorting to economic weapons. However, if discussions fail, the European Commission now has the arsenal to retaliate. It can increase customs duties on foreign products, ban access to European public procurement, or even block certain investments. In cases of absolute emergency, the EU can even freeze patents or restrict commercial licenses. But as Olof Gill, spokesperson for the Commission, points out: “Our priority is dialogue, not escalation.”
From Lithuania to Greenland: The Genesis of a Weapon
This tool was born out of recent tensions with China, particularly after Vilnius hosted a Taiwanese representative office in 2021. Beijing then severely restricted its trade with Lithuania and complicated the export of European goods containing Lithuanian components, exposing large German companies and other Member States. The EU referred the matter to the WTO (case DS610), but the slowness of the procedure highlighted the lack of a rapid response tool to protect an isolated EU Member State. This directly contributed to the design of the ACI, which came into force at the end of 2023.
The irony is that the instrument designed to counter Beijing could be used for the first time against Washington. The “Greenland case” thus becomes the first full-scale political crash test of this weapon, this time against a historic strategic ally.
Governance That Circumvents the Veto
The ACI breaks with the logic of unanimity that has long paralyzed European foreign policy. Under this mechanism, the Council decides by qualified majority to recognize a situation of coercion and to frame the response: this means that the agreement of all 27 Member States is no longer required, but rather that of at least 15 countries representing 65% of the European Union’s population.
Once coercion has been established, the Commission proposes countermeasures and adopts them by means of an implementing act; to prevent this, a qualified majority of Member States would have to vote against it, making blocking much more difficult than before. In practical terms, once the issue of coercion has been raised, the Commission has, in principle, four months to assess the case, after which the Member States vote by qualified majority on whether to activate the instrument.
This mechanism strengthens the European Commission’s power in managing external economic crises, while the European Parliament plays a more limited role, which is already fueling criticism of the democratic deficit of this new tool. Bernd Lange, Chair of the Parliament’s International Trade Committee, has nevertheless called for the procedure to be triggered quickly, arguing that it is “high time to use the anti-coercion instrument and formulate a clear EU response” to Donald Trump’s use of tariffs as a political weapon. In 2024, the EU was the United States’ largest trading partner, with more than €1.6 trillion in trade in goods and services. In other words, when Brussels threatens to retaliate, it is not a “geopolitical dwarf” speaking, but the main customer and supplier of the US economy.
Are All Europeans Ready to Pull Out the Bazooka?
Historically, Germany and Italy have been the most reluctant to use this instrument, fearing an escalation with the United States and repercussions on their export sectors. As recently as last summer, Berlin and Rome were among the most supportive of a tariff compromise with Washington, preferring an unbalanced agreement to an open trade war.
Lithuanian Finance Minister Kristupas Vaitiekūnas said on Monday that “it is premature to talk about using the anti-coercion instrument” and that “other minor measures can be taken first.” Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš also called for “dialogue” rather than “statements,” stressing that “foreign policy is a matter for diplomacy, not social media posts.” Ireland, which is highly exposed to US investment in tech and financial services, is also calling for caution: its Finance Minister Simon Harris has urged people to “keep a cool head” and use “the window of opportunity” to negotiate.
Beyond national positions, a structural obstacle remains: the EU does not yet have a mechanism to compensate for unequal losses between Member States if countermeasures are adopted. Measures targeting services, technology, or intellectual property would mainly affect Ireland and Luxembourg, while tariffs on industry would hit Germany and Italy harder. This lack of internal solidarity “remains a significant obstacle,” according to analysts.
While there is consensus on rejecting American blackmail, European capitals are divided on how to respond. From Berlin, Chancellor Friedrich Merz insists on the need to “avoid any escalation if possible,” pointing out that a sudden increase in customs duties would hit the already fragile German economy on both sides of the Atlantic. “We simply want to try to solve this problem together, and the US government knows that we could also retaliate. I don’t want that, but if necessary, we will protect our European interests as well as our German national interests,” he said, summarizing Germany’s balance between firmness and caution.
In Rome, Giorgia Meloni described Donald Trump’s tariff threats as a “mistake” and a “misunderstanding,” while calling for dialogue and referring the bulk of the issue to NATO rather than a head-on trade war with Washington.
What Other Weapons Does the EU Have in Its Arsenal?
The ACI is not the only option on the table. The EU has a €93 billion package of retaliatory measures, suspended last year after the trade agreement with Washington, which targets American products ranging from bourbon to Boeing aircraft parts, soybeans, poultry, and yachts, with 25% duties on many items.
Added to this is the possibility of freezing the 2025 EU-US trade agreement, with several leaders already calling for its ratification to be suspended as long as tariff threats persist. Brussels may also consider targeted sectoral restrictions, for example by limiting access to the single market for US banks and technology companies.
Finally, before any escalation, the European institutions reiterate their preference for diplomatic and multilateral channels, through bilateral dialogue and coordination within NATO.
Europe: A Powerhouse or a Colossus With Feet of Clay?
For supporters of a powerful Europe, this crisis validates the narrative of a European Union that is no longer “turning the other cheek” and is beginning to use its market of 450 million consumers as an instrument of geopolitical power. The EU is one of the main creditors and investors in the United States, which theoretically gives it the means to disrupt US markets if it decides to fully use its financial and regulatory weight.
But this strategic shift also raises political questions. On the one hand, an open economic war with Washington would have very real costs for already fragile European sectors and workers; for the moment, there is little discussion of compensation mechanisms and internal solidarity associated with the robust use of the ACI.
On the other hand, by concentrating more power between the Commission and governments, with the European Parliament taking a back seat, this new tool strengthens a strategic Europe without addressing the democratic deficit in its trade policy choices.
Trade War: What Are the Risks for European Employees?
An open trade war with Washington would not be a zero-sum game. The European Union is the United States’ largest trading partner, with more than €1.6 trillion in trade in goods and services in 2024: every increase in customs duties makes these flows more expensive, threatens order books and, ultimately, jobs in the export industry. If the EU retaliates against American bourbon, motorcycles, or airplanes, employees at distilleries in Kentucky or factories in Seattle will pay part of the price; in return, reprisals against the European aerospace, automotive, or agri-food industries would hit workers in Hamburg, Toulouse, or Modena. Studies of previous trade conflicts show that tariffs often end up being borne by workers and consumers—through higher prices, reduced hours, or layoffs—rather than by the shareholders of multinationals, who can pass on the costs or relocate their production.
In short, the anti-coercion instrument symbolizes the transition from a Europe long portrayed as naive to a Europe that now embraces conflict, at least in the economic arena. After a trade agreement that was heavily skewed in Washington’s favor, the European Union seems determined to show that it will no longer allow Donald Trump’s bullying tactics to dictate its behavior.
It remains to be seen whether it will be able to build the necessary internal solidarity, given that the costs of a trade war would be very unevenly distributed between states and sectors. In a fractured world where the major powers flaunt their economic strength as an instrument of power, the EU no longer really has the luxury of innocence; the question now is who this new power will serve.
FAQ – Understanding the EU, Greenland and the Anti-Coercion Instrument
Has the EU already activated the anti-coercion instrument against the United States?
No: for the moment, France and other capitals are discussing the IAC as an option and threatening to request its activation if the US surcharges come into force, but the formal procedure has not yet been completed.
What does the EU mean by 'economic coercion'?
The EU refers to coercion when a third country uses economic measures (tariffs, restrictions, boycotts) to force the Union or a Member State to change its policy in a non-trade area, such as foreign policy or security.
Who decides whether the EU responds and how?
The Commission investigates and makes proposals, the Council of Member States decides by qualified majority to recognise coercion and authorise a response, and then the Commission implements countermeasures, unless opposed by a qualified majority of Member States. The Parliament's role is mainly at the time of adoption of the regulation, not in each specific case.
What economic weapons can the EU use against Trump?
It may impose customs duties on certain American products, restrict American companies' access to European public procurement markets, or regulate certain investments and services, targeting sectors where political pressure is greatest in the United States.
Could this drive up prices or threaten jobs in Europe?
Yes, any trade war comes at a cost: EU measures may make US imports more expensive and provoke retaliation, which would affect European export sectors and, ultimately, employees and consumers. The issue of solidarity and internal compensation within the EU remains largely open to debate.
Why does the European Parliament seem so uninvolved?
Because the IAC is designed as a trade policy instrument, an area in which Member States and the Commission retain control over crisis management, while Parliament mainly has general co-legislative powers. Several researchers and NGOs criticise this democratic imbalance and are calling for greater parliamentary control over the use of this tool.
Sources:
- Trade in goods with the United States in 2024 – Eurostat
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250311-1 - The European Union’s Anti-Coercion Instrument – A closer look at decision-making under a political emergency brake – CELIS Institute
https://www.celis.institute/celis-blog/the-european-unions-anti-coercion-instrument-a-closer-look-at-decision-making-under-a-pol - What is the EU’s anti-coercion instrument, and how does it work? – Euronews
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/01/18/what-is-the-eus-anti-coercion-instrument-and-how-does-it-work - Anti-Coercion Instrument – summary sheet
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Coercion_Instrument - Protecting against coercion – Trade and Economic Security – European Commission
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/protecting-against-coercion_en
