Return centres for migrants are part of a migration debate that has run through the European Union for decades, but which has intensified significantly with the rise of far-right parties across the continent. On 1 June 2026, negotiators from the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union reached an agreement on a new regulation aimed at making the return of people staying irregularly in the EU more effective. Among the most controversial measures is the possibility of transferring certain migrants to centres located outside the EU’s borders.
For the European Commission, this reform addresses a long-standing weakness in European migration policy: many return decisions are never enforced. In fact, only around 20 to 25 per cent of return decisions are actually carried out. For its critics, however, it symbolises a gradual departure from the humanist ideal upon which Europe claims to have been built after the Second World War.
The debate goes far beyond the issue of migration alone. It raises questions about how the European Union currently interprets its own values, the legal limits set by its treaties, and the reality of migration flows that are fuelling political tensions across the continent. Is Europe facing an unprecedented migration crisis, or a crisis of perception skilfully exploited by nationalist movements? And how far can it tighten its migration policy without abandoning the very core of its political project?
What Exactly Does the New EU Regulation Entail?
Behind the alarmist headlines, the text adopted on 1 June 2026 does not automatically create giant detention centres on Europe’s doorstep. It primarily reforms the rules governing the return of people who no longer have a legal right to remain in the European Union. In practical terms, it targets third-country nationals staying irregularly in the EU, particularly those whose asylum applications have been rejected following examination.
The idea did not come out of the blue. For several years, a number of European governments have sought to outsource part of their migration policy. The United Kingdom attempted to send certain asylum seekers to Rwanda before the scheme was ruled unlawful by the UK Supreme Court in 2023 and subsequently abandoned by the Labour government in 2024.
Italy, for its part, signed an agreement with Albania to establish two centres on Albanian territory, in Shengjin and Gjader. The aim was to process certain asylum claims outside Italy, under Italian responsibility. However, the model encountered numerous legal obstacles, with several groups of migrants transferred to Albania eventually being returned to Italy following court rulings.
The European Union is therefore adopting an idea that has already been tested elsewhere, while attempting to frame it within a common legal framework. The Council of the European Union argues that the agreement reached on 1 June should make return procedures “faster and more effective” for irregular migrants, complementing the Pact on Migration and Asylum.
Let us take a concrete example. A man arrives in Greece, Italy or Spain after crossing the Mediterranean. He applies for asylum. His application is examined. If the authorities determine that he does not meet the criteria for international protection, he receives a return decision. Under the current system, this decision is often difficult to enforce: the country of origin may refuse to issue the necessary travel documents, the individual may disappear before removal, or administrative procedures may take months to complete.
Under the new regulation, a Member State could, under certain conditions, transfer that person to a third country that has concluded an agreement with the EU or with a Member State. That country would not necessarily be the migrant’s country of origin. It is precisely this point that has sparked controversy. Europe would no longer simply organise returns to countries of origin; it could send certain individuals to external centres responsible for managing their removal.
For supporters of the reform, this is a pragmatic tool designed to make migration policies more effective. For opponents, however, it symbolises the growing outsourcing of European responsibilities, with a major risk: distancing migrants from European territory and, consequently, from legal safeguards, lawyers, NGOs and democratic oversight.
Was Europe Born as a Humanist Project?
To understand the intensity of the current debate, it is necessary to revisit the origins of the European project. The European Community emerged from the ruins of the Second World War. The leaders who championed the first European integration projects had lived through the horrors of totalitarianism, deportations and conflicts that devastated the continent.
Their ambition was not merely economic. They sought to build a political space founded on peace, cooperation and the protection of human dignity. Over the decades, this ideal became embedded in the European treaties. The Union has never defined itself solely as a single market or a monetary union. It has gradually established itself as a community of values based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union states that the Union is founded on respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality and human rights. It is precisely because these values occupy such a central place in the European narrative that every migration reform raises questions extending far beyond administrative concerns.
What Do the European Treaties Actually Say?
Part of the public debate rests on a common misunderstanding. The European treaties protect the right to asylum, but they do not guarantee a general right to immigrate or settle within the European Union.
European law recognises the right of every person to apply for asylum. It also requires an individual assessment of each application and prohibits the return of a person to a country where they would face torture, persecution or inhuman treatment. Lawyers refer to this as the principle of non-refoulement.
Conversely, when an asylum application is rejected following the completion of the procedure, Member States retain the right to organise the return of the person concerned. From a strictly legal perspective, the question is therefore not whether return is lawful. Rather, it is whether fundamental safeguards continue to be respected when returns are organised to third countries. Future litigation before European courts is likely to focus on this specific issue.
One Question Remains: What Happens to Migrants Once They Have Been Transferred?
This is probably one of the main grey areas of the future European framework: what happens once a migrant arrives in the third country concerned?
Will European law continue to apply? Will European courts remain accessible? Will European institutions have the authority to monitor the living conditions of transferred individuals? At this stage, the answers remain limited.
It is precisely this issue that has attracted criticism from many NGOs and several Members of the European Parliament. In theory, agreements concluded with third countries must include safeguards relating to fundamental rights. The European Commission insists that transfers may only take place to countries considered safe and compliant with international standards. Opponents of the reform argue, however, that the outsourcing of returns could lead to a gradual outsourcing of responsibilities.
In practice, many questions remain unanswered. Who will genuinely monitor living conditions inside these centres? Will migrants have access to legal representation? Will they be able to communicate with their families? Will journalists, NGOs and European institutions have regular access to these facilities?
The issue of applicable law is also crucial. Once transferred to the territory of a third country, an individual falls, in principle, under that country’s jurisdiction. National law therefore becomes decisive in many aspects of daily life. Although agreements signed with the European Union may include safeguards, their implementation will largely depend on local authorities.
Supporters of the regulation respond that monitoring mechanisms will be built into agreements concluded with third countries and that the European Union will retain oversight regarding compliance with commitments. For now, however, many aspects remain unclear. Future agreements with partner countries will determine whether return centres are simply a new administrative tool or whether they represent a more profound transformation of European migration policy.
Is Europe Being Overwhelmed by Migration?
This is one of the expressions most frequently used by the European far right. But does it reflect reality?
The figures suggest caution and even challenge this narrative. On 1 January 2025, the European Union had a population of approximately 450.6 million people. Of these, 30.6 million were citizens of non-EU countries, representing 6.8 per cent of the population. In other words, more than 93 per cent of the EU’s inhabitants are either citizens of their country of residence or citizens of another Member State. On this scale, it is difficult to speak of demographic replacement or a demographic upheaval.
The same applies to irregular arrivals. According to Frontex, irregular border crossings detected at the EU’s external borders fell to around 178,000 in 2025, a decrease of 26 per cent compared with 2024 and the lowest level since 2021. Relative to the EU’s total population, this represents approximately 0.04 per cent of inhabitants.
On the asylum front, the European Union Agency for Asylum reports that EU+ countries received around 822,000 asylum applications in 2025. Again, the scale is important: this represents less than 0.2 per cent of the European population.
One of the far right’s recurring arguments is to combine different categories of statistics : asylum applications, residence permits, migrants already settled in Europe, births and irregular border crossings in order to create the impression of a massive and uncontrollable influx. This is misleading. An asylum seeker is not necessarily an irregular migrant.
This does not mean that migration poses no challenges. Certain Greek islands, Italian municipalities, the Canary Islands or reception centres may experience significant strain when arrivals are concentrated over a short period. Yet speaking of Europe being “overwhelmed” by migration is more a matter of political rhetoric than statistical reality.
This is where the European paradox lies. While the overall figures do not suggest that Europe is facing a demographic crisis, certain local situations can create a very real sense of emergency. It is precisely this gap between statistical reality and lived experience that nationalist movements exploit to shape their narratives and fuel fears.
Why Is the Far Right Winning the Culture War?
If the data do not support the conclusion that Europe is being overwhelmed by migration, why has migration become such a central issue in public debate? Because in politics, perceptions often matter just as much as statistics.
A dramatic arrival of migrants on a Mediterranean beach, an overcrowded reception centre or a widely shared news story on social media can have an immediate emotional impact. By contrast, statistical reports rarely attract the same level of public attention.
Nationalist parties have understood this dynamic perfectly. Over the past decade, they have succeeded in making immigration one of the defining issues of European politics. The result is clear: even centrist and conservative parties that once rejected measures promoted by the far right now adopt some of its proposals.
Do Return Centres Represent a Departure from the European Ideal?
This is ultimately the central question. For supporters of the regulation, the European Union is not abandoning its values. They point out that the right to asylum remains protected, that every application must continue to be assessed individually, and that those affected by return centres are, in principle, individuals who have already received a final negative decision.
The European Commissioner for Home Affairs has defended the reform as a means of restoring credibility to the European asylum system. According to the European Commission, a system that protects refugees must also be capable of enforcing its decisions when applications are rejected. Otherwise, the rules risk losing legitimacy in the eyes of part of the population.
Within the European Parliament, the European People’s Party (EPP) and parts of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) supported this approach. They argue that the EU must strengthen border management and enforce more return decisions to prevent migration from continuing to fuel nationalist parties.
Criticism, however, has been widespread on the left of the political spectrum. The Left group, which includes MEPs from La France Insoumise, has condemned the reform, arguing that it risks depriving migrants of European legal safeguards. Several left-wing MEPs believe that the EU is increasingly drawing inspiration from policies long promoted by Europe’s most conservative governments. Irish MEP Lynn Boylan argues that the Union is moving towards a “Fortress Europe” model by making relations with third countries conditional on cooperation regarding migrant readmissions. In her view, recent EU proposals focus increasingly on removal and deterrence rather than the protection of fundamental rights.
The Greens have also expressed concerns. They argue that centres established outside EU territory could make access to justice more difficult, reduce NGO oversight and weaken democratic scrutiny by European institutions. Dutch Green MEP Tineke Strik, a recognised specialist in migration issues, believes that the European Commission is yielding to populist pressure by paving the way for “return hubs” in third countries. According to her, this approach risks weakening protections for migrants while distancing the European Union from its commitments to fundamental rights.
Some human rights organisations go even further. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) argue that outsourcing migration policies risks diluting accountability. In their view, Europe may be tempted to delegate part of its obligations regarding the protection of fundamental rights to third countries.
Critics also point out that experiments conducted elsewhere in the world have produced mixed results. Since its inception, the European Union has sought to reconcile border control with the protection of fundamental rights. The debate surrounding return centres shows that this balance is now more contested than ever. For some, the reform represents a pragmatic response to a complex migration reality. For others, it marks an ideological shift revealing a Europe increasingly influenced by narratives long promoted by the far right.
One thing is certain: beyond the fate of a few thousand migrants lies a much broader question — what kind of Europe do the twenty-seven Member States wish to build in the twenty-first century?
Sources:
- Council of the European Union, “Council and Parliament reach agreement on the return of third-country nationals staying illegally” – https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/06/01/council-and-parliament-reach-deal-on-returns-of-illegally-staying-third-country-nationals/
- European Commission, “Commission welcomes political agreement on the Return Regulation” – https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-welcomes-political-agreement-return-regulation-2026-06-02_en
- European Parliament, Legislative dossier on the Return Regulation – https://www.europarl.europa.eu
- Eurostat, “EU population diversity by citizenship and country of birth” – https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_population_diversity_by_citizenship_and_country_of_birth
- Frontex, “Annual Risk Analysis 2025” – https://www.frontex.europa.eu
- European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), “EU asylum applications down by a fifth in 2025” – https://www.euaa.europa.eu/news-events/eu-asylum-applications-down-one-fifth-2025-amid-shifting-geopolitical-dynamics
- EPP Group, Tomas Tobé, “Illegal migrants must now return” – https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/deal-reached-illegal-migrants-must-now-return
- The Left Group, Lynn Boylan, “The EU’s migration blackmail strategy” – https://left.eu/the-eus-migration-blackmail-strategy/
- The Greens/EFA Group, Tineke Strik, “Commission proposal panders to populism over responsible migration policies” – https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/article/press/commission-proposal-panders-to-populism-over-responsible-pragmatic-migration-policies
- Amnesty International, Analysis and responses on the outsourcing of migration policies – https://www.amnesty.org
- Human Rights Watch, Migration and asylum in Europe – https://www.hrw.org
- European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), Analysis of the European Union’s return policies – https://ecre.org
- Reuters, Coverage of the EU return regulation agreement – https://www.reuters.com
- Le Monde, “The European Union adopts stricter rules on the deportation of migrants” – https://www.lemonde.fr
- Greens/EFA, Tineke Strik, “Commission proposal panders to populism over responsible & pragmatic migration policies” – https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/article/press/commission-proposal-panders-to-populism-over-responsible-pragmatic-migration-policies
- The Left, Lynn Boylan, “The EU’s migration blackmail strategy”, https://left.eu/the-eus-migration-blackmail-strategy/
