In the space of just a few months, Peter Magyar has become the figurehead of the movement promising a break with Viktor Orbán’s sixteen-year rule in Hungary. A former senior official within the Fidesz system, Peter Magyar now embodies a new Hungarian right-wing movement that promises to restore the rule of law, rebuild ties with the European Union and redefine the country’s relationship with Ukraine.
Peter Magyar, a product of the Orbán system who has become an opponent
Born in 1981 in Budapest, Peter Magyar trained as a lawyer and comes from a family with long-standing ties to Hungary’s circles of power. His great-uncle, Ferenc Mádl, served as President of the Republic between 2000 and 2005, which meant he was firmly embedded in the political and administrative networks of post-socialist Hungary from the outset.
Having joined Fidesz at a very early stage, he built a career within the state apparatus following Orbán’s return to power in 2010. He held posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary’s Permanent Representation to the European Union, and then the Prime Minister’s Office, thereby playing a part in consolidating the very system he now denounces.
His personal background brings him even closer to the heart of power: his ex-wife, Judit Varga, served as Minister of Justice from 2019 to 2023 and was one of the key architects of the reforms that undermined the independence of the judiciary. The couple, who spent time in Brussels before returning to Budapest, epitomised the institutional elite of Fidesz.
The rift began behind the scenes, before becoming public when he started to denounce the “national, sovereign and bourgeois Hungary” touted by Orbán as nothing more than a “political construct” masking corruption and the capture of the state. For Peter Magyar, the problem is no longer just a government, but a “regime” organised around political loyalty and the enrichment of those close to power.
Manifesto: what he promises to change
Peter Magyar places the concept of “regime change” at the heart of his project, with a highly political promise to change everything without overturning the system: to remain conservative whilst re-establishing fairer rules of the game. It is an institutional, social and moral programme that touches on the everyday lives of Hungarians.
On public services, he promises to reinvest in healthcare and education, two sectors that have been severely weakened during the Orbán years. Hospitals are suffering from chronic staff shortages, low pay and a mass exodus of staff abroad; Hungarian teachers have been protesting in recent years against the deterioration of their working conditions and pay. Magyar wants to make these two sectors budgetary priorities, announcing pay rises, recruitment drives and a symbolic upgrading of the status of healthcare workers and teachers.
On housing and the cost of living, he presents himself as the candidate who wants to make Hungary liveable again for the middle and working classes. He emphasises the need to tackle rising rents in major cities, to develop a stock of affordable housing and to regulate certain markets dominated by those close to the government. He also stresses the fight against inflation which has hit Hungary hard through a more predictable economic policy, one less marked by power plays and conflicts with the EU that have driven up the cost of borrowing and weakened the currency.
On the social front, Peter Magyar has pledged to double child benefit and increase small pensions, targeting in particular pensioners and low-income families who have seen their energy and food costs skyrocket. These measures are intended to address widespread anger over the concentration of wealth in the hands of oligarchs close to Fidesz, whilst many Hungarians live on low wages and pensions.
On the issue of minorities, his stance remains cautious and rather conservative. He does not endorse the aggressive rhetoric and scapegoating campaigns that have characterised the Orbán era, particularly towards migrants, Roma people or LGBT+ individuals. However, he does not, for that reason, propose an overtly progressive agenda: his stated aim is rather to “de-polarise” and to stop using these issues as permanent tools for political mobilisation.
In everyday life, he promises a Hungary where people can breathe easier: less media propaganda, less visible corruption in major public contracts, less cronyism in access to services and institutions that actually work. This involves a commitment to restoring media independence, strengthening the role of oversight bodies and paving the way for membership of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. On paper, this is a promise of a clean break with the party-state logic of the Orbán era.
Relations with Europe: pro-EU, but to what extent?
When it comes to the European Union, Peter Magyar takes a stance that mirrors Orbán’s: whereas Orbán has built his popularity by engaging in repeated power struggles with Brussels, Magyar promises a more conciliatory approach. He presents himself as a liberal conservative, pro-European but critical who wants to bring Hungary back into the mainstream of the European centre-right, without ceasing to defend national interests.
His primary objective is clear: to normalise relations with Brussels in order to release European funds that have been frozen due to breaches of the rule of law. He promises swift reforms of the justice system, greater transparency in public procurement and a strengthening of checks and balances precisely the areas the Commission had identified as problematic. This normalisation is also the cornerstone of his economic strategy: without European funds, it will be difficult to revive public investment and restore essential services.
Peter Magyar says he is ready to adopt a constructive stance within the European institutions: no longer systematically blocking budgetary decisions, sanctions or aid to Ukraine, and ceasing to use the veto as a bargaining chip. On this basis, several officials in Brussels see him as the promise of a “normal” partner after years of constant tension.
On the issue of the euro, he is adopting a cautious stance: he is not setting a date, making accession conditional on real convergence and the stabilisation of the Hungarian economy, and prefers, for the time being, to speak of a “timeframe” rather than a timetable. This caution can be interpreted as a sign that he intends to remain mindful of the nationalist sentiments of a section of his electorate.
The question remains as to how far this pro-EU shift extends. On the rule of law, EU funds and diplomatic tone, the break with Orbán would be clear. But on sensitive issues, migration, enlargement, societal matters, Peter Magyar remains a conservative, who will no doubt seek to influence European decisions from within rather than embrace them unconditionally.
Ukraine, Russia, foreign policy
When it comes to Russia, Peter Magyar inherits a situation of extreme energy dependence and cannot, in the short term, afford the “divorce” that some European partners are calling for. Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary signed a 15-year contract with Gazprom in 2021 for approximately 4.5 billion cubic metres of gas per year via TurkStream. According to data cited by the European press, nearly 80% of Hungary’s energy needs (gas and oil combined) are met by Russian hydrocarbons. In 2025, Russia still supplied 93% of Hungary’s imported crude oil, a sharp rise from 61% in 2021.
In this context, Peter Magyar can promise to “turn the page on Orbán”, but not to cut off supplies overnight. He has announced his intention to gradually reduce dependence on Moscow, diversify supply sources and make greater use of regional interconnections, whilst maintaining existing contracts for the time being. The challenge is clear: to move closer politically to the EU and NATO without triggering an energy crisis that would plunge the Hungarian economy into recession. In the short term, his government will be forced to deal with this reality, which limits its room for manoeuvre on sanctions and energy policy.
On the issue of Ukraine, Peter Magyar has adopted a deliberately middle-of-the-road stance. He wants to break Orbán’s isolation and no longer block financial aid to Kyiv or key European decisions, which objectively brings him closer to Brussels’ expectations. However, he rejects a fast-track route to Ukraine’s EU membership: he points out that the country is “at war” and that, in his view, a hasty integration would be contrary to the Union’s rules and interests. On this point, he echoes the reservations expressed by both right-wing forces and a section of the left in the European Parliament, including within The Left group, which opposes the idea of enlarging the Union to include a country at war and under a state of emergency.
Peter Magyar says he is in favour of providing economic and political support to Kyiv, but remains opposed to Hungary sending weapons directly and to deeper military involvement. His approach is one of diplomatic balancing: aligning more closely with the Western position than Orbán does, without embracing the maximalist agenda of certain Member States on enlargement and military aid. His first announced trips to Warsaw and Brussels, indicate a desire to align Hungary with the pro-Ukrainian camp, but in a more moderate form, tailored to a Hungarian electorate that is largely resistant to direct involvement in the war.
Another clear signal of Peter Magyar’s new foreign policy direction concerns the International Criminal Court (ICC). On 20 April 2026, he announced that he would revoke Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC, which had been decided by Viktor Orbán in 2025 and was due to take effect on 2 June 2026. In practical terms, this means that Budapest will remain bound by the obligation to execute international arrest warrants issued by the Court, including the one targeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.
When asked about this specific case, Peter Magyar stated that any leader subject to an ICC arrest warrant would be arrested if they entered Hungarian territory, noting that “if someone enters the territory of an ICC member state and is the subject of an arrest warrant, they must be taken into custody”. Unlike Orbán, who had welcomed Netanyahu to Budapest whilst preparing to withdraw from the Court, Magyar has therefore chosen to adhere fully to the framework of international criminal law, even if this puts him at odds with certain allies and with part of his own conservative camp.
Continuity and change under Orbán
Peter Magyar’s rise to prominence came in opposition to Viktor Orbán, but also stemmed from him: he was one of the most successful products of the very system he now promises to dismantle. On the rule of law, the media and institutions, the break with the past is clear; on immigration and some social issues, continuity is embraced. This tension runs through his entire political project.
On the rule of law and the media, Peter Magyar promises a radical change of direction. He states his intention to restore an independent judiciary, re-establish a genuine separation of powers and put an end to the government’s stranglehold on public broadcasting, going so far as to consider temporarily suspending state television news programmes in order to reform them. He announces a strengthening of regulatory bodies, membership of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and a new media law to guarantee pluralism, in a sector where Orbán had methodically built a media ecosystem to suit his own ends. In this regard, if these promises are kept, it will indeed mark a break with the current regime.
At the European level, the contrast is just as stark: Peter Magyar wants to free Hungary from its role as a thorn in the EU’s side. He promises to unlock European funds by meeting the rule of law criteria, to stop using the veto as a weapon of blackmail and to restore Hungary to the camp of “reliable” partners on major decisions, particularly aid to Ukraine. Whereas Orbán built his legitimacy on constant confrontation with Brussels, Magyar is banking on normalising relations to revive the economy and restore the country’s image.
But on immigration, continuity with Orbán is a given. At his first major press conference on 13 April, Peter Magyar announced that he would oppose the European Pact on Migration, that he would maintain the barrier on the southern border and that he would not support “any mechanism for the redistribution” of asylum seekers. He insists that Hungary will continue to take a “very hard line” against irregular immigration and even promises to plug the gaps in the fence erected under Orbán.
This firm stance is not limited to asylum: in a speech delivered in late 2025, he had already promised that, under a Tisza government, Hungary would not accept any non-Hungarian guest workers from non-EU countries from June 2026 onwards, on the grounds of protecting domestic jobs. Whereas Orbán combined anti-migration rhetoric with the massive use of cheap foreign labour, Magyar promises to put a stop to non-European “guest workers”, whilst maintaining the “fortress” approach at the border. In this regard, his rhetoric is at times even stricter than that of his predecessor.
The difference lies more in tone than in substance: Peter Magyar says he wants to stop using immigration as a constant tool for anti-EU propaganda, whereas Orbán had made it a daily source of political fuel. But for those affected, the practical reality the border fence, the refusal to relocate and the crackdown on foreign workers will change little, at least in the short term.
When it comes to minorities, and particularly LGBT+ people, the contrast is more pronounced in rhetoric, but concrete action has yet to be taken. In his victory speech, Peter Magyar declared that “here, no one will be stigmatised for loving differently from the majority”, a statement that came as a welcome surprise after years of official campaigns targeting LGBT+ people. This inclusive message breaks with Orbán’s rhetoric, which has seen a proliferation of laws and posters linking homosexuality with “propaganda” and a threat to children, and has supported a de facto ban on the Pride march in Budapest through restrictions linked to so-called “child protection” laws.
Can we conclude that Peter Magyar will not seek to ban the Pride march in Budapest and that he will reverse some of the anti-LGBT measures introduced during the Orbán era? For the time being, nothing is certain. Even before his election, he had criticised the ban on Pride, explaining that the government was using these measures to divert attention from the social crisis and promising to protect the right of assembly if he came to power. Several observers believe that a Magyar administration would put an end to hateful poster campaigns and stop using the state apparatus to target LGBT people, which would represent a real change in everyday life.
However, he has not, at this stage, committed to repealing the legislative measures adopted under Orbán: the 2021 law equating the “promotion” of homosexuality with child pornography in content intended for minors, restrictions on sex education, the ban on same-sex couples adopting and the inability for transgender people to legally change their gender. His stated priority is the reconstruction of the state and the restoration of the rule of law, not the expansion of new social or family rights. For the time being, he promises respect, an end to state stigmatisation and protection of the right to protest; he remains silent on the issue of full and complete legal equality.
This is undoubtedly where the dividing line between continuity and change lies: Peter Magyar has announced an ideological de-escalation, an end to campaigns of systematic hostility, a less aggressive tone and a symbolic opening towards groups targeted by Orbán, but he has not committed to overturning all the laws that have restricted their rights. On immigration, he is maintaining the status quo; on LGBT rights, he promises to end the witch-hunt, without guaranteeing any legal reversals.
All in all, Peter Magyar’s “break” looks more like a return to normality: a return to traditional conservatism on borders and the family, an end to excessive propaganda and a realignment with the EU but without a shift towards a progressive agenda. His camp’s strategy is clear: to show that it is possible to turn the page on Orbán’s legacy of corruption, European isolation and the personalisation of power, whilst preserving the essence of the conservative compromise that has shaped Hungarian society for over a decade.
Sources:
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10 April 2026. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/04/10/peter-magyar-l-homme-qui-veut-detroner-viktor-orban-a-la-tete-de-la-hongrie_6221234_3210.html - Le Grand Continent. “Elections in Hungary: who is Péter Magyar, the man who could bring Orbán’s reign to an end?” 11 April 2026. https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2026/04/12/elections-en-hongrie-qui-est-peter-magyar-lhomme-qui-pourrait-mettre-fin-au-regne-dorban
- TF1 Info. “Hungary: five things to know about Peter Magyar, the conservative opposition leader who ousted Viktor Orbán”. 5 April 2026. https://www.tf1info.fr/international/hongrie-elections-legislatives-2026-cinq-choses-a-savoir-sur-peter-magyar-l-opposant-conservateur-2251234.html
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