When polling stations closed at 10 p.m. on 23 June 2016, most opinion polls predicted a narrow victory for the campaign to remain in the European Union. Like many observers, I spent that evening watching the results unfold on my television screen. Having completed a Master’s degree specialising in European labour and employment law, I found it difficult to imagine that the British people would actually choose to leave the European Union.
Yet the United Kingdom had always occupied a unique position within the European project. Having joined the European Economic Community in 1973, after two successive vetoes by France, it had retained the pound sterling, opted out of the Schengen Area and negotiated a series of exemptions over the decades. From my perspective, the political and economic advantages of this exceptional status appeared to outweigh its constraints by a considerable margin.
Then the first results began to arrive. Very quickly, one place dominated every television broadcast: Sunderland. This former industrial city in north-east England voted 61 per cent in favour of Leave. BBC journalists immediately realised that something unexpected was unfolding. As the night progressed, other working-class strongholds followed the same path: Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Stoke-on-Trent, Doncaster and Barnsley.
By dawn, the verdict was clear. With 51.9 per cent of the vote, the United Kingdom had chosen to leave the European Union. That night, many across Europe dismissed the result as an irrational outburst of populism. Ten years later, that interpretation seems far too simplistic.
Brexit cannot be understood solely through the prism of Euroscepticism or nationalism. It was also the culmination of deep social, economic and territorial fractures that had widened over several decades. To understand why millions of Britons voted to leave, we must look far beyond the referendum campaign itself.
Deindustrialisation: Britain’s forty-year economic fracture
The roots of Brexit stretch back to the early 1980s. During Margaret Thatcher’s years in office, Britain underwent one of the most profound economic transformations in its modern history. Coal mining, steelmaking, shipbuilding and textile manufacturing, all industries that had shaped entire regions declined rapidly as successive governments shifted the economy towards financial services and the expanding service sector.
Between 1979 and the mid-1990s, Britain lost around 2.5 million manufacturing jobs, representing almost half of its industrial workforce. Hundreds of coal mines closed permanently. Shipyards that had once made the north-east of England one of the world’s leading maritime regions disappeared. Steel plants shut down one after another.
Meanwhile, the City of London emerged as one of the world’s most influential financial centres. But another Britain was being left behind.
In Sunderland, once renowned for its shipbuilding industry, the docks gradually fell silent. In Middlesbrough, long regarded as the heart of Britain’s steel industry, blast furnaces closed one after another. In Hartlepool, Stoke-on-Trent and countless other towns, generations watched the industries that had sustained their communities simply disappear.
This was never just an economic story. It was the collapse of an entire way of life. Young people left in search of opportunities elsewhere. Independent shops disappeared from high streets. Town centres deteriorated. Public confidence weakened. Above all, many communities developed a lasting sense that Westminster—and increasingly London itself—had abandoned them.
When the global financial crisis struck in 2008, many of these regions were already economically fragile. The recession merely accelerated a decline that had been unfolding for decades.
How austerity weakened Britain’s public services
The financial crisis marked the beginning of another decisive chapter. From 2010 onwards, successive British governments implemented one of Western Europe’s most ambitious programmes of fiscal austerity. Local authorities experienced severe reductions in public funding. In some parts of England, council budgets fell by between 20 and 30 per cent over the following decade.
The consequences quickly became visible. Libraries closed. Bus routes disappeared. Community centres shut their doors. Local councils postponed investment projects. Food banks, once regarded as emergency support, became a permanent feature of everyday life in many communities.
Britain’s National Health Service arguably the country’s most cherished public institution since its creation in 1948 also came under mounting pressure. By the time of the Brexit referendum in 2016, almost 3.9 million patients were already waiting for hospital treatment or surgery. Accident and Emergency departments struggled to meet demand. Staff shortages became increasingly difficult to ignore, while waiting times continued to lengthen.
For many Britons, the conclusion appeared obvious. Public services were deteriorating while London continued to prosper. This widening gap between the capital and many former industrial regions became one of the defining political fault lines that shaped the Leave vote.
How Brussels became the perfect scapegoat
One crucial question remains. Were factory closures, austerity measures, NHS pressures or deindustrialisation actually caused by Brussels?
In most cases, the answer is no. Industrial policy, healthcare, public spending and the organisation of public services have always been the responsibility of successive British governments. Yet political reality is often far more powerful than institutional responsibility. For more than two decades, sections of the British press steadily shaped a narrative in which the European Union became the convenient explanation for many of Britain’s problems. Tabloid newspapers frequently portrayed Brussels as an unelected bureaucracy imposing unnecessary regulations, undermining national sovereignty and allowing uncontrolled immigration.
Over time, repeated headlines proved remarkably effective. Brussels gradually became the symbol onto which years of economic frustration, political distrust and social anxiety could be projected. Research published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation supports this interpretation. Areas recording the strongest support for Leave were often those characterised by persistent poverty, lower educational attainment, weaker social mobility and a deep sense of political neglect.
From this perspective, Brexit appears less as a rejection of Europe itself than as the expression of a profound loss of confidence in Britain’s political establishment. It was not simply a vote against Brussels. For millions of voters, it was a vote against a system they believed had stopped working for them.
The political genius of the Leave campaign: turning frustration into victory
By the time the referendum campaign entered its final months, Britain’s economic and social challenges were undeniable. Yet recognising those problems was one thing; persuading voters that leaving the European Union was the solution was quite another.
This is where the Leave campaign proved politically formidable. Rather than engaging in technical debates about European treaties, institutional reforms or the legal complexities of EU membership, its architects focused relentlessly on everyday concerns. They spoke about hospitals, immigration, agriculture, fisheries, wages, the cost of living and national sovereignty.
Above all, they offered a remarkably simple promise. Take Back Control. Few political slogans have proved so effective.
In just three words, it suggested that Britain had lost control of its borders, its laws, its money and, ultimately, its future. The message was emotionally powerful because it transformed a series of complex structural problems into a single, easily identifiable cause.
If Britain was struggling, the implication was clear: decisions were being taken somewhere else. The campaign reinforced this narrative through highly visual and memorable symbols. None became more famous than the now-iconic red campaign bus carrying the slogan: “We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead.” The message was simple, direct and easy to remember.
Its accuracy, however, was another matter. Economists, independent statisticians and even the UK Statistics Authority challenged the figure throughout the campaign. The £350 million represented Britain’s gross contribution to the EU budget before accounting for Margaret Thatcher’s rebate, negotiated in 1984, or the billions of pounds that flowed back into the country through agricultural subsidies, regional development funds and research programmes.
Britain’s actual net contribution was therefore significantly lower. Yet factual precision mattered less than political effectiveness. The slogan condensed years of frustration into a single, emotionally compelling argument: money supposedly being “sent to Brussels” could instead rescue Britain’s struggling healthcare system.
For many voters, that message resonated far more strongly than any detailed economic explanation. Immigration became another defining issue. Following the European Union’s enlargement in 2004, the United Kingdom was one of only a handful of Member States to open its labour market immediately to workers from Central and Eastern Europe.
The consequences were visible. Between 2004 and 2016, the number of EU citizens living in Britain rose from around 1.5 million to more than 3.5 million. For many communities, particularly those already experiencing economic decline this rapid demographic change reinforced concerns about pressure on housing, schools, hospitals and public services.
Whether those perceptions reflected economic reality became almost secondary. Most independent economic studies concluded that EU migration had made a positive overall contribution to Britain’s public finances and economic growth. European workers were generally younger, more likely to be employed and more likely to contribute in taxes than they received in benefits.
But elections are rarely decided by macroeconomic indicators. They are won or lost through people’s lived experiences. If local GP surgeries became harder to access, if waiting lists grew longer or affordable housing became scarcer, many voters naturally connected those changes to immigration, regardless of what economists concluded.
The Leave campaign understood this distinction perfectly. It did not seek to win an academic argument. It sought to win a political one. The digital battlefield also played a decisive role.
For the first time in British political history, social media became central to a nationwide referendum campaign. Facebook, in particular, allowed campaigners to target highly specific groups of voters with tailored messages based on age, location, interests and online behaviour.
Different audiences often received entirely different political advertisements. Some were shown messages about immigration. Others about sovereignty. Others about the NHS or taxation.
The Cambridge Analytica scandal, revealed several years later, raised profound questions about how personal data had been used to influence political behaviour during the referendum. Although the precise impact remains debated, the episode transformed public understanding of digital campaigning and political micro-targeting.
The Leave campaign also benefited from something far older than social media. For decades, parts of Britain’s tabloid press had cultivated an increasingly Eurosceptic narrative. Stories about supposedly absurd European regulations became a familiar feature of newspaper front pages. Brussels was regularly portrayed as an intrusive bureaucracy imposing unnecessary rules while undermining Britain’s independence.
Many of those stories were exaggerated. Some were misleading. Others were simply false. Yet repetition proved remarkably effective. By 2016, millions of readers had spent years absorbing a consistent message: Britain’s problems were increasingly linked to Europe. Against that backdrop, the referendum did not emerge in a political vacuum. It represented the culmination of decades of political storytelling.
On 23 June 2016, voters were therefore making far more than a decision about European Union membership. They were expressing their views on economic insecurity, public services, immigration, political trust, national identity and the growing belief that successive governments had failed to listen to large parts of the country. Brexit became the vehicle through which all those frustrations converged. Ten years later, the campaign slogans have faded. The promises, however, can finally be measured against reality.
The economic and social consequences of Brexit, ten years on
On the morning of 24 June 2016, the United Kingdom woke up deeply divided. Ten years later, hindsight finally allows us to compare the promises made by the Leave campaign with reality.
What has been the impact of Brexit on the NHS?
It is impossible to discuss Brexit without mentioning the famous red bus that became one of the defining symbols of the Leave campaign. It carried a simple and memorable promise: “We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead.”
In reality, this figure represented the UK’s gross contribution to the European Union budget. It excluded the British rebate negotiated by Margaret Thatcher in 1984, as well as the EU funding that flowed back into the UK through agricultural subsidies, regional development programmes and research funding. Several independent organisations, including the UK Statistics Authority, criticised the figure during the campaign for being misleading.
But beyond the controversy surrounding the slogan, the key question remains: did Brexit improve the NHS?
The answer is mixed. Public spending on healthcare has increased since 2016. However, this trend had already begun before the referendum and cannot be attributed solely to Brexit.
At the same time, the NHS’s structural problems have continued to worsen. Waiting lists now exceed seven million patients. Accident and Emergency departments remain under severe pressure, while hospitals continue to struggle with chronic staff shortages.
Brexit has also complicated recruitment from European Union countries. Before the end of free movement, tens of thousands of doctors, nurses and healthcare professionals from across Europe worked in the NHS. Since 2021, recruitment from EU countries has declined significantly, forcing the UK to rely increasingly on professionals from India, the Philippines, Nigeria and other non-European countries.
In other words, leaving the European Union has not resolved the NHS’s long-standing problems. The service continues to suffer primarily from years of underinvestment, demographic pressures and workforce shortages rather than from Britain’s former membership of the EU.
What impact has Brexit had on immigration?
Immigration was undoubtedly the defining issue of the Leave campaign. In 2016, many Britons believed that free movement prevented the United Kingdom from controlling its own borders. Campaign posters, televised debates and much of the British press repeatedly portrayed immigration as excessively high.
Legally speaking, Brexit fundamentally changed the situation. Since January 2021, free movement between the United Kingdom and the European Union has come to an end. EU citizens are now subject to the same points-based immigration system as applicants from the rest of the world, with visas awarded according to qualifications, skills and labour market needs.
The objective was straightforward: reduce immigration. The outcome has been more nuanced. Immigration from EU Member States has declined sharply. However, arrivals from non-EU countries have risen considerably in order to fill labour shortages in healthcare, transport, hospitality, social care, higher education and other sectors.
As a result, the United Kingdom now exercises greater legal control over immigration policy than before Brexit. Yet overall migration remains historically high. Brexit has therefore restored political control over immigration rules, but it has not removed the British economy’s dependence on foreign workers.
This illustrates one of the central paradoxes of Brexit: regaining legal sovereignty does not necessarily change economic reality.
What are the real economic consequences of Brexit?
For Leave campaigners, leaving the European Union was supposed to allow the United Kingdom to regain its full economic freedom. Freed from EU regulations, Britain would be able to negotiate its own trade agreements, attract more investment and achieve stronger economic growth.
Ten years later, the picture is far more nuanced.
The United Kingdom remains the world’s sixth-largest economy, while London continues to rank among Europe’s leading financial centres in several sectors. The economic collapse predicted by some during the referendum campaign never materialised.
However, there is now broad consensus among economists that Brexit has weighed on the UK’s economic performance.
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) estimates that leaving the Single Market will reduce the UK’s long-term productivity by around 4 per cent, while trade with the European Union is expected to be around 15 per cent lower than it would have been had the UK remained an EU member.
This decline is largely the result of new barriers to trade. Before 2021, British businesses could export goods to France, Belgium or Germany almost as easily as they could to another part of the United Kingdom. Today, exporters must complete customs declarations, provide health certificates for certain products, comply with rules of origin and undergo additional administrative checks.
Large multinational companies have generally been able to absorb these extra costs thanks to dedicated customs and compliance teams. For many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), however, these new requirements have proved far more challenging.
Some have stopped exporting to the European Union altogether. Others have established subsidiaries within the EU to avoid part of the new administrative burden. Business organisations have repeatedly pointed out that these additional costs weigh much more heavily on smaller firms than on large corporations.
Brexit has therefore not closed the door to the European market. It has simply made access to it slower, more complex and more expensive.
Have British farmers and fishermen regained their freedom?
Agriculture and fisheries were among the sectors most supportive of Brexit. For years, many British farmers had criticised the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), arguing that its administrative requirements, environmental regulations and reporting obligations created unnecessary bureaucracy.
Fishermen voiced similar frustrations. Many believed that the Common Fisheries Policy benefited European fleets at the expense of British coastal communities. During the referendum campaign, the slogan “Take back control of our waters” became one of the most powerful symbols of the Leave movement.
In this respect, Brexit has undoubtedly changed the rules. The United Kingdom now has greater freedom to design its own agricultural policy and negotiate access to its fishing waters. However, this regained sovereignty has come with significant economic trade-offs.
Before Brexit, nearly 60 per cent of British agri-food exports were destined for the European Union. Producers enjoyed unrestricted access to the world’s largest single market, with no customs duties and virtually no administrative barriers.
Since 2021, every shipment of meat, dairy products, seafood and many other food products has required export health certificates, customs declarations and additional inspections.
For fresh products, where even a few hours’ delay can compromise an entire shipment, these new procedures have created considerable logistical difficulties. Exporters of shellfish, fish and meat products were among the first to report serious disruptions. Many businesses have seen transport costs increase, while others have lost part of their European customer base.
British agriculture has also faced another major challenge: labour shortages. Before Brexit, tens of thousands of seasonal workers from Central and Eastern Europe travelled to the UK each year to harvest fruit and vegetables. With the end of free movement, many farms struggled to recruit the workforce they depended on.
The British government was eventually forced to introduce seasonal worker visa schemes in an attempt to address these shortages. In the end, Brexit has undoubtedly given British farmers and fishermen greater regulatory autonomy.
But that increased freedom has come alongside new commercial barriers that simply did not exist before the UK’s departure from the European Union. It is one of Brexit’s greatest paradoxes. Regaining sovereignty has not eliminated economic interdependence.
What lessons should the European Union learn from Brexit?
Ten years after the referendum, Brexit is about far more than the relationship between London and Brussels. It is, above all, a warning for the European project itself. The 2016 referendum tells the story of a deeply divided country.
On one side stood London, the major cities, university graduates and much of Britain’s younger generation, who voted overwhelmingly to remain in the European Union. On the other were many former industrial regions of northern England, medium-sized towns affected by decades of deindustrialisation and large parts of rural Britain, where a majority voted to leave.
Factory closures, years of austerity, the gradual decline of public services and a growing sense of economic insecurity all contributed to a profound loss of confidence in the political establishment. Brexit serves as a reminder of a lesson that the European Union cannot afford to ignore.
When people feel that their standard of living is declining, that opportunities are disappearing or that their communities have been left behind, technical arguments about the benefits of the Single Market are rarely enough to convince them.
Despite the United Kingdom’s departure, the European Union remains home to almost 450 million people and continues to be the world’s largest single market. Eurobarometer surveys also show that, in the years following Brexit, support for EU membership has reached some of its highest levels in decades across many Member States.
Yet this apparent stability should not breed complacency. Many of the challenges that fuelled Brexit deindustrialisation, regional inequality, the housing crisis, pressure on public services and a growing sense of political neglect continue to affect several parts of Europe today.
If these divisions continue to deepen, similar frustrations could emerge elsewhere. The real lesson of Brexit is therefore not simply about the costs or benefits of leaving the European Union. It is about the importance of ensuring that citizens feel protected by the political system in which they live.
The European Union must continue to demonstrate, alongside national governments, that it can help protect workers, reduce regional inequalities, support industrial transitions and strengthen public services. Leaving a political union may restore legal sovereignty. It does not automatically resolve the economic and social challenges that gave rise to public dissatisfaction in the first place. Ten years after the referendum, one question remains.
Will Europe be able to address the frustrations that made Brexit possible before similar divisions emerge elsewhere? Meanwhile, one symbolic development illustrates a more pragmatic future. The United Kingdom is expected to rejoin the Erasmus+ programme from 2027, restoring opportunities for thousands of students, apprentices and young people to study, train and collaborate across Europe. It is a reminder that while political institutions may diverge, cooperation in education, research and youth mobility continues to serve the interests of both sides. Perhaps that is Brexit’s most enduring lesson. A country can leave the European Union. It cannot leave Europe.
Why did the United Kingdom leave the European Union?
Brexit was the result of a combination of factors: a sense of neglect in former industrial regions, concerns about immigration, criticism of European bureaucracy, a desire to regain control over national legislation, and mistrust of the political elite.
Is Brexit a success or a failure?
The overall picture is mixed. The United Kingdom has regained legal sovereignty in many areas and can now sign its own trade agreements. On the other hand, most independent bodies believe that Brexit has slowed economic growth, complicated trade with the European Union, and worsened recruitment difficulties in certain sectors.
Has Brexit reduced immigration to the UK?
Immigration from the European Union has fallen sharply since the end of free movement. By contrast, immigration from non-EU countries has increased significantly. The United Kingdom now exercises greater control over its borders, but overall immigration remains high.
Can the United Kingdom rejoin the European Union?
Yes. Legally speaking, there is nothing to prevent it. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union allows any European country to apply for membership. However, the United Kingdom would not automatically regain the favourable terms it enjoyed before Brexit, such as its budget rebate or opt-outs from the euro and the Schengen Area. It would have to submit a new application, negotiate with the 27 Member States, and comply with the current conditions for accession.
Which politicians played a major role in Brexit?
Several prominent figures left a lasting mark on this political period. Prime Minister David Cameron promised a referendum in 2013 in an attempt to ease divisions within the Conservative Party and halt the rise of the Eurosceptic UKIP, led by Nigel Farage. Following the Leave victory, David Cameron resigned the day after the vote. Boris Johnson, a leading figure in the Leave campaign, later became Prime Minister and led the United Kingdom through its formal exit from the European Union on 31 January 2020. Other figures, including Michael Gove, also played an important role in the campaign.
Why did David Cameron organise the Brexit referendum?
This is undoubtedly one of the greatest ironies in modern British political history. David Cameron personally supported the United Kingdom remaining in the European Union. His promise to hold a referendum was primarily an attempt to heal divisions within his own Conservative Party and stem the rise of UKIP, whose Eurosceptic message was attracting an increasing share of Conservative voters. His gamble was to hold a referendum that he believed he could win, thereby settling the European question once and for all. Instead, the outcome was the exact opposite: the Leave campaign won with 51.9 per cent of the vote, David Cameron announced his resignation the following day, and the United Kingdom embarked on the historic process of leaving the European Union. A referendum conceived as a solution to an internal party dispute ultimately reshaped the future of both the United Kingdom and Europe as a whole.
Will the UK rejoin Erasmus+ in 2027?
Yes. The UK is set to rejoin Erasmus+ from January 2027, following an agreement reached with the European Union. This is one of the symbols of the rapprochement between London and Brussels after Brexit.
The country left Erasmus+ following its departure from the EU and replaced it with the Turing Scheme, a less comprehensive national programme, particularly because it did not promote reciprocal exchanges with European universities to the same extent.
This return does not call Brexit into question, but it shows that London still sees some forms of European cooperation as beneficial, particularly for students, apprentices, teachers and organisations.
Sources:
- Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – Brexit analysis – https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/the-economy-forecast/brexit-analysis/
- Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – The effect on productivity of leaving the EU – https://obr.uk/box/the-effect-on-productivity-of-leaving-the-eu/
- Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – How are our Brexit forecasting assumptions holding up? – https://obr.uk/box/how-are-our-brexit-forecasting-assumptions-performing/
- UK Statistics Authority – Statement on the use of official statistics on contributions to the European Union –
https://uksa.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/news/uk-statistics-authority-statement-on-the-use-of-official-statistics-on-contributions-to-the-european-union/ - UK Statistics Authority – Use of the “£350 million per week” figure to describe the UK’s financial contributions to the EU –
https://uksa.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/correspondence/use-of-350million-per-week-figure-to-describe-uks-financial-contributions-to-the-eu/ - Office for National Statistics (ONS) – Claims made by the Leave campaign during the Brexit debate –
https://www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/leavecampaignclaimsduringbrexitdebate - Joseph Rowntree Foundation – UK Poverty / Regional inequalities – https://www.jrf.org.uk/
- NHS England – Referral to Treatment (RTT) Waiting Times Statistics – https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/rtt-waiting-times/
- Home Office (UK Government) – Immigration system statistics
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-statistics-quarterly-release - Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) – Agriculture in the United Kingdom
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/agriculture-in-the-united-kingdom - House of Commons Library – Research Briefings: Brexit – https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/topic/brexit/
- Eurobarometer – Public opinion in the European Union – https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/
